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THE INDUBIO PRO DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLE: A RIGHT TO
DEVELOPMENT IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES
JOSt MANUEL ALVAREZ ZARATE*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is important to recall that the current International Economic Law ("IEL")
regime has been construed considering the ideas and promises of growth and
economic development for all, including developing countries, as states are bound
by such promises allegedly made in good faith.' The liberal interpretation that
progressive liberalization of access to goods, services and capital, on one hand,
whilst denying access to knowledge and technology, on the other2-absorbed into
the interpretation of IEL rules by investment arbitrators and trade panels-may no
longer deny the IEL foundational Right to Develop ("RTD") and its corollary
principle in dubio pro development. The former interpretation may reduce the
policy space3 for developing countries to adopt developmental policies though
their local regulation.
4
There are at least three scenarios in which the adoption of developmental
policies may have interpretative problems: (i) in the political discussion, when
countries negotiate and discuss the construction of or changes to the economic
system and the models of investment and trade regimes; (ii) in the process of
* *Dr. Josd Manuel Alvarez Zirarte is a Professor of International Economic Law at the Extemado
University of Colombia. He also works as a sole practitioner in trade and investment areas involving to
local regulation. Many thanks to Markus Wagner for his helpful criticism and suggestions and to
Daniel Garcia and Maria Angdlica Prada, for excellent research assistance in the process of writing this
paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
1. Such promises can be found in the negotiating agendas, preambles, and rules of trade and
investment treaties. For some approaches to the RTD in trade and investment, see Constantine
Michalopoulos, Trade and Development in the GA TT and WTO: The Role of Special and Differential
Treatment for Developing Countries, working draft, (World Bank working draft, 2000); U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, Switz., June 2000, International Investment
Agreements: Flexibility for Development, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/1 8 (2000).
2. In the age of information and in a technological society, access to knowledge is a mandatory
requisite for acquiring development. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) contains advanced requisites for access to knowledge and technology and no mandatory
provisions for providing the transfer of technology to countries; therefore, the way in which this
agreement was written limits access to knowledge instead of liberalizing it, unlike GATT and GATS do
for goods and services respectively. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
3. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and Development Report, Global
Governance and Policy Space for Development, UNCTAD/TDR/2014 (2014) [hereinafter Global
Governance].
4. For investment rules, see Lise Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, State Liability for Regulatory
Change: How International Investment Rules are Overriding Domestic Law, 1:5 INVESTMENT TREATY
NEwS, 3, 3 (2014).
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applying the rules by interpreting them when countries need to pursue their
economic interests, by enacting policies for their own economic development; and
(iii) before dispute settlement mechanisms, such as trade panels or investment
tribunals.
5
The above merits an economic-political debate and a legal discussion; this
paper will focus on the latter. There is a huge amount of academic literature in the
field of law and development6 that supports the economic-political discussion and
helps us understand the strategic importance of development for emerging nations
and its relationship to trade and investment rules. However, this paper will mainly
focus on the legal aspects in the adoption of developmental policies by emerging
nations, as the arguments pleaded above and made by an IEL dispute settlement
body must be free from political considerations.7 The IEL rules on investment and
trade, currently in force in many states, are part of the mandatory international rule
of law for states. Therefore, these rules and their interpretation are shaping states'
development ideals and have important consequences when international economic
obligations are assessed, both in trade and investment disciplines, at the point in
8which they collide with the RTD. As Markus Wagner points out, "international
trade and investment law can offer valuable insights for one another;" both systems
are apparently "twins separated at birth" and are thus sufficiently similar enough to
warrant a meaningful comparison,9 which justifies the inclusion of both regimes in
5. Sonia E. Rolland does a good job at explaining these three concerns for trade in her book.
See SONIA E. ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT AT THE WTO (2012) [hereinafter ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT]..
6. See David Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: an Essay on'the Study of Law and
Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1972). See also DAVID M. TRUBEK, Introduction to DAVID M.
TRUBEK, LAW, STATE AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: CASE STUDIES 1-16 (Trubek, Alviar,
Coutinho & Santos, eds.), https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c 638/g2y2j/landsbookintro final.pdf, David
Kennedy, Laws and Developments, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: FACING COMPLEXITY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 17-26 (John Hatchard & Amanda Perry-Kessaris eds. 2003) ("The idea that building 'the rule
of law' might itself be a development strategy instead encourages the hope that choosing law could
substitute for the perplexing political and economic choices which have been at the centre of
development policy-making for half a century. The legal regime offers an arena to contest those
choices, but it cannot substitute for them. The hope that it might encourages people to settle on the
particular choices embedded in one legal regime as if they were the only alternative."); Laura Victoria
Garcia Matamoros, El derecho del desarrollo como base para la construcci6n del derecho al
desarrollo, INT'L L.: REV. DE COLOMB. DERECHO INT., 235-72 (2007); DONATELLA ALESSANDRINI,
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE MULTILATERAL TRADE REGIME: THE FAILURE AND PROMISE OF
THE WTO's DEVELOPMENT MISSION (2010).
7. As for investment treaty arbitration, as Susan Franck claims, systemic bias against developing
countries is unacceptable and shows that the outcomes on cases do not show any bias by arbitrators.
See Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT'L L.
J. 435, 437 (2009) [hereinafter Franck, Development and Outcomes]. On the contrary, the quantitative
empirical methodologies are to be taken with care, as there is a lack of data included on some studies,
and the consistency of it needs to be clear as information about what was extracted or missing needs to
be available to readers. See Gus Van Harten, Fairness and Independence in Investment Arbitration: A
Critique of "Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration," INVESTMENT TREATY
NEWS (Dec. 16, 2010), www.iisd.org/itn/tag/arbitrator-independence.
8. See Global Governance, supra note 3, at I.
9. See Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International
Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 1, 10 (2014)..
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this paper, and suggests that the RTD and the in dubio pro development follow the
same conditions in both regimes.
The question of the existence of a right for nations to develop in trade and
investment agreements is crucial and controversial, particularly when assessing
some of the economic consequences of those agreements for developing nations,
l °
and when developing countries must regulate for economic developmental
purposes. The RTD, as revealed in this paper, would grant broader policy space in
limited cases to developing countries.'1  It is not intended, however, that
developing countries would have unlimited policy space, as that would undermine
the trade and investment systems.
12
Liberal theories, which do not recognize the RTD, apply to when developing
countries rely on their own efforts to mobilize productive resources and to raise
their levels of domestic investment, human capital, and know-how.13 However, for
this, they must have the widest possible room available to maneuver and determine
which policies work in their particular conditions, and not be subjected to a
constant shrinking of their policy space by IEL institutions originally established to
support more balanced and inclusive outcomes,14 where indeed the RTD was
recognized.
The RTD looks as if it is circumscribed to political discourse. It is not, as
shown by its recognition in soft-law instruments such as declarations'5 and U.N.
General Assembly resolutions,'6 or as hard-law in human rights treaties, which
recognize development as inextricably linked to economic, social and political
rights.'7  Nevertheless, in treaty practice, development seems to have been
neglected to the point where it has become a non-enforceable right. While it is
customarily established in treaty preambles, the right to development has received
little practical application by states and dispute settlement bodies when such
10. See ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 5, at 2. This paper will take the same approach
mentioned by Sonia Rolland which goes beyond the protectionism versus openness debate, where the
issue goes to development policies and to what has been called "policy space" to describe the range of
domestic economic and industrial policies, which would be WTO compatible. Jost E. ALVAREZ, THE
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 13-24 (2011).
11. Notwithstanding that from a legal perspective the RTD raises questions as to defining
development and the nature or content of such a right, here an approach is attempted in order to open a
wider debate arguing that the RTD has legal status in the IEL system.
12. See Wagner, supra note 9.
13. Global Governance, supra note 3, at I.
14. Id.at I-II.
15. See U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Hum. Rts., Rep. on its 33rd Sess., Feb. 14, 1977, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/S.R.1389 (Feb. 14, 1977).
16. See G.A. Res. 41/128, Declaration on the Right to Development, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128
(Dec. 4, 1987).
17. For an overview of the discussion, see Isabella D. Bunn, The Right to Development:
Implications for International Economic Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1425 (2000); James Thuo
Gathii, The Right to Development, Human Rights and Economic Partnership Agreements, in REALIZING
THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 259 (2013); Diane A. Desierto, Development as an International Right.
Investment in the New Trade-BasedllAs, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 296 (2011).
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entities are enforcing international economic obligations.'8 Academics have also
neglected the RTD discussion, with some ignoring the legal perspective of
developing countries, whittling it down to an ideological position19 or deeming it
an unenforceable right before dispute settlement bodies.20 However, a few well-
founded exceptions, where development concerns are seen as a right, have
reluctantly arisen.21  The disdain for the RTD has driven some investment
arbitrators to interpret the opposite of the in dubio pro development, i.e. when in
doubt, treaty obligations are meant to protect the rights of the investor and not the
state's rights.
II. Is DEVELOPMENT AN ECONOMIC ISSUE, AN ISSUE OF LAW, OR BOTH?
A. Development as a Right of the State
This paper does not seek to address an issue that is common in academic
research on this topic, which is whether the RTD is a human right and as such, how
difficult it may be to enforce this right before an international tribunal.23 Hence,
for the purposes of this work, the RTD is not understood exclusively as a human
right but as a state's economic right that is embedded in trade and investment
treaties. Scholars have recognized the significant problems presented by analyzing
the RTD from a human rights perspective for its recognition in trade and
24investment treaties. It may be problematic to use a human rights perspective in
an IEL case, as, due to the fragmentation of international law, a dilemma of
systemic application and interpretation of law will ultimately be faced.25 However,
applying the RTD directly to an IEL case, as an obligation embedded in the
18. A good example can be seen when developing countries are implementing a panel or
appellate body report as "they may face specific challenges due to their socioeconomic vulnerabilities
or costs associated with implementation." Sonia E. Rolland, Considering Development in the
Implementation of Panel and Appellate Body Reports, 4 TRADE L. & DEv. 150, 150 (2012) [hereinafter
Rolland, Considering Development].
19. RUDOLPH DOLZER & CHISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 14 (2008).
20. Alvarez, supra note 10, at 95-99.
21. In the case of trade, the RTD has had some policy space. See Rolland, Considering
Development, supra note 18. Towards IIAs, the RTD matters have been left as a "jurisdictional
gatekeeping." See Desierto, supra note 17, at 296.
22. See Pro investment cases like Socidtd Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Jurisdiction (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 518 (2005). Van
Harten, infra note 123, showed 140 cases on legal issues on jurisdiction, that tend to be issues for which
the text of an investment treaty is ambiguous or silent, leading to disagreements about the appropriate
approach. Expansive resolutions of an issue may be said to favor claimants by expanding the authority
of investment treaty tribunals and by allowing more claimants to proceed. In general, seventy-six
percent of the decisions were expansive investor-friendly against twenty-three percent for state.
23. See Bunn, supra note 17 at 1427.
24. ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 5 at 28 (doubts that the RTD has not gained legal
status and "has not percolated to the WTO").
25. Rep. of the Study Group of the Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of International Law:
Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 58th Sess., July 3-
Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (2006).
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system, eliminates the need for that discussion.
In human rights discourse, it has been argued that even if the RTD exists,
governments of developing states owe it to their own populations, and thus is not
owed by foreign developed countries. This situation is not within the scope of this
paper. Nevertheless, assuming that such a claim is correct, it would not serve as an
argument against the use proposed for the RTD - in fact, it is an argument that
would strengthen its use in trade and investment cases. If developing states have
the international duty to grant and guarantee the RTD as a human right of their
inhabitants, they must not be placed in a position in which they must decide
whether to fulfill such developmental expectations or to be subject to claims
because a trade partner or an investor may challenge the country's measures
implemented for development purposes.
Thus, as will later be discussed, the RTD can be understood and identified
from within IEL's system, without direct recourse to human rights treaties. If the
rules and principles that grant the RTD can be found within the IEL system, and
thus can be applied directly in a trade or investment case, one does not need to
search for such a right in another international treaty. Therefore, this paper calls
for states and adjudicators to reinterpret trade and investment treaties26 as
developmental language can already be found there.
Another recurrent objection to the enforceability of the RTD is the non-
justiciability of the issues to which it may give rise.27 Some scholars have
concluded that the RTD is non-justiciable under international law.28 This paper
proposes a different approach. If IEL adjudicators were given broad discretion in
deciding commonly understood trade and investment disputes as well as the power
to determine their jurisdiction and merits, adjudicators would then have also the
ability to decide on matters applying the in dubio pro development principle.
For these reasons, this paper proposes to overcome such a dilemma by
acknowledging that a claim against a developed country before an international
dispute resolution mechanism is not a prerequisite for recognition of the RTD.
Rather, just as defendants may plead certain affirmative defenses in municipal law
when sued in local courts, a developing country may employ the RTD and in dubio
pro development principle as a defense in an IEL case. By recognizing that states
enjoy a right not to be declared responsible for breaching IEL obligations when
pursuing development-related goals, a state's RTD can be given normative value
within the IEL system.
26. As proposed by LISE JOHNSON & MERIM RAZBAEVA, STATE CONTROL OVER
INTERPRETATION OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 1 (2014). States could be more active in interpreting the
investment treaties as "a relatively efficient tool to achieve the objectives of adding clarity to and
reducing exposure under existing treaties." Id.
27. Desierto, supra note 17, at 316-19.
28. See Rolland, Considering Development, supra note 18.
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B. What Kind of Economic Development Must International Economic Law
Confront?
Before tackling issues of development, one must first be able to define the
concept. Scholars and international institutions have attempted to define
development in a variety of ways.29 Questions arise about whether it should only
encompass economic growth as seen in some trade and investment treaties,30 or
whether other factors must be analyzed when determining what contributes to a
country's development. Moreover, it is vital to determine which developmental
policies are in conformity with international obligations. Although its meaning is
deeply influenced by economic and political theories, this issue has legal
consequences, as it is important to clarify what amount of policy space is needed to
pursue development goals, taking into account the RTD and the in dubio pro
development principle.
A more comprehensive understanding of development, one that recognizes
economic growth as intrinsically tied to areas of environmental sustainability; food
security; the reduction of extreme poverty, hunger, and child mortality; access to
health; the promotion of education and gender equality,3 1 would give an idea of
how much policy space development requires in order to be fully achieved. This
definition closely coincides with the legal one given by the Andean Tribunal to
international development and human rights instruments.32
The prior definition recognizes that whilst economic growth is fundamental, it
is insufficient, and development as a concept must encompass a more wholesome
set of elements that guarantee the well-being of a state's inhabitants. Hence, for
the purposes of this paper, development-related measures will be seen as those that
a government adopts in order to foster economic growth through supporting
economic strategic areas and that promote the well-being of its inhabitants through
access to education, food security, healthcare or environmental protection.
IEL must confront the question of development in the academic arena and in
practice when states are drawing up specific policies to foster development and
throughout international dispute settlements. The question of determining the
margin of appreciation granted to governments in order to adopt public policies
that foster development for their nations arises when IEL imposes international
obligations upon states, both in Trade and Investment disciplines. National
29. ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 5, at 15, compiles a comprehensive overview from the
evolution, trends, and different perspectives from scholars and institutions and recognizes that "[t]he
particular processes of economic growth, industrialization, and the expansion of social and political
opportunities become ncapsulated in the term 'development."'
30. The discussions have not been concentrated upon the economic growth measures, but upon
the myth of its desired consequences, which has left several serious problems unattended, including
social inclusion, alleviation of poverty, and the general wellbeing of the majority of people.
31. See Global Governance, supra note 3 at I (citing Henry Morgenthau, who insisted that,
"Prosperity like peace is indivisible. We cannot afford to have it scattered here or there among the
fortunate or to enjoy it at the expense of others. Poverty, wherever it exists, is menacing to us all and
undermines the well-being of each of us.").
32. See infra notes 97 and 98.
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development strategies that comprise all of the above will need to be accompanied
by regulatory changes;33 therefore it is likely that states or investors would
challenge some of those regulations. Throughout the last decade, the rise in
investment disputes has posed this question and, even though in the trade
discipline the question could be considered less controversial, it persists
nevertheless.
34
IEL rules are drafted differently in the case of investment and trade, which
lead to different interpretations in each case. For investment rules, they are drafted
in such a way that their meaning is often broadly worded; while in the case of trade
rules, the undertakings are more detailed. Thus, interpretation is crucial for
determining the precise extent to which a state is responsible for a breach of an
international obligation, or whether its behavior was sanctioned by international
law. With regards to the scope of development, no single route may be used. On
the one hand, regional trade agreements ("RTAs") among developing countries
frame development as a core issue. The inclusion of asymmetric provisions to
support the less industrialized Member States is one way to recognize that the
relationship between trade liberalization and development35 is not limited to
growth. Conversely, the scope of developing provisions in RTAs among
developing and developed countries may be narrower.
Yet, as "development rights" language is included in treaties, the interpreter is
required to give extent and meaning to the definition; thus new arguments must be
made by parties, advocates, and arbitrators, to incorporate economic reasoning,
development facts, and available data into the term's meaning. Determining the
appropriate definition and extent of development is not an easy job, but it is
important that such an endeavor be carried out in order to avoid relying on
fabrications and myth.36
III. THE RIGHT To DEVELOPMENT IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES
The RTD is not a right ruled by the principle "first in time, first in right."
37
33. See Global Governance, supra note 3 at VII.
34. The persistent push for a more universal, transformative, and sustainable approach to
development will play a key role in the setting of new goals and targets for policymakers, in addition to
its moral implications, growing inequality causes seriously damage to social well-being, threatens
economic progress and stability, and undermines political cohesion. See Global Governance, supra
note 3, at VI.
35. See ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 5, at 57-58.
36. Different economic approaches can be used to determine the extent of development, but any
one used must rely on data and the nature of the policy and or measures, not on myths. Many myths
had been construed against developing countries, i.e. that to developing countries the pacta sunt
servanda principle did not have any meaningful force. As Jason Jackee pointed out and successfully
demonstrates: "that, contrary to the myth, a long line of international jurisprudence demonstrates that
state promises to foreign investors have been strongly presumptively enforceable as a matter of
consistent international law and practice." See Jason Webb Jackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State
Promises to Foreign Investors Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1550, 1551 (2008).
37. A principle of law which holds that the first person to pose or use a right has the right to use it
2015
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States that had precedence in time and had acquired economic development first
indeed had the advantage with regards to the RTD, but just because such states
obtained full power over economic development does not mean they can later bar
economically underdeveloped nations from employing the RTD. The RTD is
recognized in multiple international instruments and by trade and investment
treaties for developing countries, as will be discussed later.
The promises of growth and development for all must not be forgotten when
interpreting trade treaties; as such promises achieved legal status when their words
were included in different international agreements. As Jason Jackee points out,
38
just as the law protects promises made to investors, so too must it enforce promises
to developing countries.
In 1986, in the context of settling the agenda for the Uruguay Round,
developing countries accepted the inclusion of three "new trade issues," - namely
services; intellectual property; and investment - in negotiations, in exchange for
development and growth. There was a compromise by the United States and other
countries to include the development issue in favor of developing countries, in
exchange for the inclusion of the three 'new issues' within the negotiating
mandate.39 As a result, the RTD was construed as a foundational value of
international economic trade treaties as it is imbued with commonly shared
transcendental and democratic values.40 Accordingly, growth and development in
developing countries is a goal that the IEL system must always strive to attain.
The RTD is an implicit value of the IEL system because its rules have been
teleologically formulated by a language impregnated with commonly shared values
that were formulated when negotiating agenda objectives and treaty preambles.
41
These values later served to inspire the rules of the legal system by which such
treaties must abide.
As the in dubio pro development principle is implicit in trade and investment
law and has emerged from the systemic integration of treaty preambles, Special
and Differential Treatment ("SDT") rules and negotiation purposes42 have the
in the future over the right of later users. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or
Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L. REV. 881, 881 (2000).
38. See Jackee, supra note 36, at 1150, 1154.
39. See THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) (Terence P.
Stewart ed., 1993).
40. See Markus Wagner, Taking Interdependence Seriously: The Need for a Reassessment of the
Precautionary Principle in International Trade Law, 20 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 713, 718
(2012). Wagner addresses the Appellate Body of the WTO use of values in interpreting IEL norms in
the Brazil-Retreated Tyres: "A panel must consider the relevant factors, particularly the importance of
the interests or values at stake, the extent of the contribution to the achievement of the measure's
objective, and its trade restrictiveness." Id.at 732.
41. See Global Governance, supra note 3, at II (stating "Pursuing bold international collective
action to correct the deep inequities of the world, along with determined and innovative domestic policy
initiatives, was what motivated the participants at Bretton Woods 70 years ago and in Geneva 50 years
ago.").
42. For a deduction of principles in law, see Acosta Alvarado & Paola Andrea, The General
Principles of Law and Principle Type Rules: Its Conceptualization and Use in International Law, 25
VOL. 43:4
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power to bind treaty parties.43
Sufficient elements to support opiniojuris that an RTD and its correlative in
dubio pro development principle exists in International Economic Law include: the
constant incorporation of development language into IEL treaty preambles as a
goal; the express acknowledgement of the non-violating nature of subsidies; and
health measures that protect the environment.
Therefore, as democratically agreed upon principles on their own constitute
an autonomous formal source of international law and are not necessarily
subsumed under custom or treaties, panelist and arbitrators interpreting the RTD
and the in dubio pro development principle in a case must give it proper
consideration.4
The in dubio pro development principle also manifests itself in the
presumption of conformity with development-related measures. In conjunction
with the bonafide principle, it is to be presumed that states act in conformity with
their international obligations,45 such that when a state adopts a measure that seeks
REv. DERECHO DEL ESTADO, 193, 193-219 (2010).
43. See Wagner, supra note 9, at 43 (citing Philippe Sands, Searching for Balance: Concluding
Remarks, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL L.J. 198, 202 (2002) on the shared values of investment and trade regimes:
"those charged with interpreting and applying treaties on the protection of foreign investment need to
take into account the values that are reflected in norms that have arisen outside the context of the
investment treaty which they are applying.").
44. As for the importance of principles as an international law source in case law, see Pulp Mills
on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, 142-43 (Apr. 20) (separate opinion by J.
Antonio Cancado Trindade).
45. See Appellate Body Report, US-Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC- Hormones
Dispute, 315, WT/DS320/AB/R (adopted Nov. 14, 2008); Appellate Body Report, Canada-
Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, 315, WT/DS321/AB/R (adopted
Nov. 14, 2008) ("The Member required to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings may be
presumed to have acted in good faith when adopting the implementing measure."). As for investment,
see Saluka Invs. BV (Neth.) v. Czech 255, 259-60, 262-63 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006).
It is now established in international law that States are not liable to pay compensation to a
foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their regulatory powers, they adopt in a non-
discriminatory manner bonafide regulations that are aimed at the general welfare... The
Tribunal further recalls that, in an accompanying note to the 1967 OECD Draft Convention
on the Protection of Foreign Property, it is provided that measures taken i the pursuit of a
State's 'political, social or economic ends' do not constitute compensable xpropriation ...
Similarly, the United States Third Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations in 1987
includes bonafide regulations and "other action of the kind that is commonly accepted as
within the police power of State" in the list of permissible-that is, non-compensable-
regulatory actions... In the opinion of the Tribunal, the principle that a State does not
commit an expropriation and is thus not liable to pay compensation to a dispossessed alien
investor when it adopts general regulations that are "commonly accepted as within the police
power of States" forms part of customary international law today. There is ample case law in
support of this proposition. As the tribunal in Methanex Corp. v. USA said recently in its
final award, "[ilt is a principle of customary international law that, where economic injury
results from a bonafide regulation within the police powers of a State, compensation is not
required"... That being said, international law has yet to identify in a comprehensive and
definitive fashion precisely what regulations are considered "permissible" and "commonly
accepted" as falling within the police or regulatory power of States and, thus, non-
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to bolster development, it must be deemed prima facie as in conformity with its
46international obligations. In this way, the challenge to an IEL obligation to such
measures should be assessed under a higher standard than challenges to measures
seeking other ends. In principle, it is not meant to be an irrefutable rule, as a
claimant may successfully prove that even when a government has adopted a pro-
development measure, it has been adopted beyond its limits.
47
A. The Right to Development in Trade
Since the origins of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"),
the IEL regime held the idea that progressive liberalization of access to goods will
lead the world to progress and improved welfare.48 The same idea lay behind the
system for services and capital, after the Uruguay Round.49 As seen before, the
increase in trade, welfare and growth was one of the justifications for the
intellectual property protection contained in TRIPS. However, the agreement was
written in a way that allowed for no liberalization and limited access to knowledge
and technology.
50
Based on these hypotheses, interpreters including governments, arbitrators,
and trade panels, have considered, with some disdain, the application of RTD to
compensable. In other words, it has yet to draw a bright and easily distinguishable line
between non-compensable regulations on the one hand and, on the other, measures that have
the effect of depriving foreign investors of their investment and are thus unlawful and
compensable in international law.
Id.
46. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines, 278,
WT/DS23I/AB/R (adopted Oct. 23, 2002) ("We must assume that Members of the WTO will abide by
their treaty obligations in good faith, as required by the principle of pacta sunt servanda articulated in
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention. And, always in dispute settlement, every Member of the WTO
must assume the good faith of every other Member.").
47. Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000,
296-98, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (adopted Jan. 27, 2003).
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention, entitled Pacta Sunt Servanda, to which several
appellees referred in their submissions, provides that "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." The United States itself
affirmed "that WTO Members must uphold their obligations under the covered agreements
in good faith"... Clearly, therefore, there is a basis for a dispute settlement panel to
determine, in an appropriate case, whether a Member has not acted in good faith. Nothing,
however, in the covered agreements supports the conclusion that simply because a WTO
Member is found to have violated a substantive treaty provision, it has therefore not acted in
good faith. In our view, it would be necessary to prove more than mere violation to support
such a conclusion.
Id.
48. See the GATT preamble which establishes that: "Recognizing that their relations in the field
of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living,
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective
demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and
exchange of goods." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I1, 55
U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter GATT].
49. Id.
50. See TRIPS, supra note 2.
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the political trade sphere or to dispute mechanisms.5 1 As mentioned before, this is
due to the misguided belief that such a right is not a part of the IEL system and
therefore, it is unenforceable.
Growth and development initiatives were on the minds of trade negotiators
hailing from 96 countries at the Punta del Este Declaration Ministerial on
September 20, 1986, when the Uruguay Round of GATT Negotiations was
launched. As a result, they are repeatedly mentioned in several sections of the
Declaration.52 For example, Part I establishes that the removal of trade distortions,
protectionism, the preservation of GATT's basic principles and the development of
a more open, viable, and durable multilateral trading system would promote both
growth and development.53 It also states that the negotiations should benefit all
countries, especially the less developed contracting parties; that the principle of
differential and more favorable treatment embodied in Part IV of GATT and in the
decision of November 28, 1979, would apply to the negotiations; and additionally,
that developed countries did not expect reciprocity for their commitments made in
trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade by
developing countries.
54
Part II of the Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este provides that as a result
of service-based negotiations the parties "shall aim to establish a multilateral
framework of principles and rules for trade in services, including elaboration of
possible disciplines for individual sectors, with a view to expansion of such trade
under conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization and as a means of
promoting economic growth of all trading partners and the development of
developing countries."
55
For purposes of this paper, the RTD can be recognized in two different ways:
(i) as a special exception to the right of access to trade, the Fair and Equitable
Treatment ("FET"), and indirect expropriation standards, or (ii) as an autonomous
rule, which must be applied as a lex specialis rule to the trade and investment
norm.
Some maintain regional and free trade agreements ("FTAs") as well as
international investment agreements ("IIAs") reduce policy space and "that
regardless of the countries involved, by signing those agreements developing-
country governments relinquish some of the policy space they have been
endeavoring so hard to preserve at the multilateral level.",56 Notwithstanding,
customary international law suggests otherwise, while preambles, rights and
obligations of RTAs and IIAs signed after 2004 have all recognized the RTD in
51. See Rolland, Considering Development, supra note 18; see also Phillip Morris Brands Sarl v.
Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, (July 2, 2013), 6
ICSID Rep. 14 (2013).
52. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Sept. 20, 1986, GATT B.I.S.D. (33d Supp.),
at 19 (1987) [hereinafter Punta del Este Declaration].
53. Id. at Part I.
54. Id.
55. Id at Part II. See also, ALESSANDRINI, supra note 6, at 91.
56. See Global Governance, supra note 3 at X.
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one form or another, given the revival of the important role of industrial policy and
the failure of free market policies.57
One FTA objective is the promotion of development for its states' parties, as
the language used in the treaties makes clear reference to it. Most FTAs refer to
development in their preambles or in the text of the treaties. However, there is not
a single model wording. References to development range from a brief mention in
the preamble to a very detailed clause or article on development objectives. For
example, most FTAs between Canada and other countries include a number of
references to development in the preamble, such as the promotion of sustainable
development; broad-based economic development in order to reduce poverty,
while recognizing the differences in the level of development and the size of the
Parties' economies; and the importance of creating opportunities for economic
development.58
Other treaties, like the ones signed between the United States and Colombia
and the United States and Peru, refer in their preambles to the promotion of a
"broad-based economic development," the reduction of poverty, the protection of
the environment and the promotion of sustainable development.59 Treaties signed
by the European Union ("EU") contain more comprehensive clauses regarding the
concept and outcomes of development. For instance, the FTA between the EU and
Central American States ("CA") includes considerations in its preamble
acknowledging the difference in economic and social development existing
between the CA countries and the EU.60 The preamble also recognizes the "shared
57. States have begun to add new wording to development related treaties in the last decade
thereby allocating some policy space to implement developmental policies. This has produced an
emerging opiniojuris that recognizes the RTD as an IEL rule, which is being crystalized by its constant
inclusion in treaties.
58. Free Trade Agreement between Canada nd the Republic of Colombia, Can.-Colom., Nov.
21, 2008,2011 Can. T.S. No. 11.
59. See Preamble,
PROMOTE broad-based economic development in order to reduce poverty and generate
opportunities for sustainable economic alternatives to drg-crop production;.. IMPLEMENT
this Agreement in a manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation,
promote sustainable development, and strengthen their cooperation on environmental
matters.
United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, Apr. 12, 2006, State Dep't No. 06-128. See
also, Preamble,
PROMOTE broad-based economic development in order to reduce poverty and generate
opportunities for sustainable economic alternatives to drug-crop production;.. IMPLEMENT
this Agreement in a manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation,
promote sustainable development, and strengthen their cooperation on environmental
matters.
U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Colom., Nov. 22, 2006, T.I.A.S. 06-226.
60. See Preamble,
HIGHLIGHTING their commitment to working together in pursuit of the objectives of
poverty eradication, job creation, equitable and sustainable development, including aspects
of vulnerability to natural disasters, environmental conservation and protection and
biodiversity, and the progressive integration of the Republics of the CA Party into the world
economy;... CONSIDERING the difference in economic and social development existing
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objective of strengthening the process of economic and social development in
Central America," and states that the "agreement will create a climate conducive to
growth in sustainable economic relations between them [the two regions], more
particularly in the trade and investment sectors which are essential to the
realisation of the economic and social development and technological innovation
and modernisation."61  The two regions were aware of the need to promote
sustainable development and reaffirmed their sovereignty to exploit their natural
resources, according to their own environmental and developmental policies to
promote sustainable development.
62
Similarly, the FTA between the EU, Colombia, and Peru includes
comprehensive references to development objectives in its preamble which
expresses a desire "to promote comprehensive economic development with the
objective of reducing poverty and creating new employment opportunities and
improved working conditions, as well as raising living standards in their respective
territories by liberalising and expanding trade and investment between their
territories.63  Furthermore, the reference to development is also expressly
contained in a provision that enumerates the objectives of the agreement.64 The
parties are also "COMMITTED to implementing this Agreement in accordance
with the objective of sustainable development, including, the promotion of
economic progress, the respect for labor rights and the protection of the
environment, in accordance with the international commitments adopted by the
Parties.,65 Moreover, the difference in economic and social development between
the signatory Andean Countries and the EU and its Member States were
considered.66 Beyond the preamble, Article 4, which addresses the agreement's
objectives, states the promotion of trade should be conducted "in a way that
contributes to the objective of sustainable development, and [] work in order to
integrate and reflect this objective in the Parties' trade relations.,
67
RTAs in Latin America have also recognized the RTDs of its members. For
example, Articles 1 and 2 of the Cartagena Agreement,68 a founding treaty for the
Andean Community, to which Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru are parties,
promotes as its two main objectives a balanced, harmonious, and equitable
between the Republics of the CA Party and the EU Party and the shared objective of
strengthening the process of economic and social development in Central America.
Agreement Establishing an Association Between Central America, on the one hand, and the European
Union and its Member States, on the other, June 29, 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 346).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, on the one part, and




67. Id.at art. 4(j).
68. Andean Subregional Integration Agreement, May 26, 1969, art. 1,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/othertreaties/details.jsp?treatyid=393 [hereinafter Cartagena
Agreement] (founding the Andean Community).
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development of the Member Countries and an improved standard of living for the
sub-region's population.69  There are several other provisions in the agreement
which favor development, such as Article 108, which considers the different stages
of development of the member states; Article 109, which stipulates a special
regime for Bolivia and Ecuador that grants them greater participation i  order to
gradually diminish their development disparities with other Member States.7" The
Andean States have likewise agreed to act jointly before any international
organization in order to receive the technical assistance and project financing
required for Ecuador and Bolivia's development.7'
This Andean Pact also provides flexibility to Bolivia and Ecuador to improve
their possibilities for development and participation in the Andean Community's
industrialization process72 and allows for the Agreement's Andean Community
Commission to establish better conditions in favor of those countries, than those
initially contemplated in the Agreement.
73
B. The Right to Development in Investment
An increasing number of countries include specific language in the preamble
to their HAs aimed at making clear that the objective that investment must not be
pursued at the expense of other key public policy goals, such as the protection of
health, safety, or environment.74
Contrary to the WTO-regime or the rules on trade contained in FTAs, HAs
69. Id.
70. Idat art. 109 ("Bolivia and Ecuador shall enjoy a special regime, with a view toward
gradually reducing the differences in development that currently exist in the subregion. This system
shall enable them to attain more rapid economic growth through effective and immediate participation
in the benefits of the area's industrialization and the liberalization of trade.").
71. Idatart. 118.
The Member Countries commit hemselves to act jointly to secure technical assistance and
financing for Bolivia and Ecuador's development needs, particularly for projects related to
the integration process, from the Andean Development Corporation and any other
subregional, national, or international organizations. The resources for those projects shall
be allocated in accordance with the basic objective of reducing the existing differences in
development among the countries by making an attempt to favor Bolivia and Ecuador
markedly. The Member Countries, moreover, shall jointly request the Andean Development
Corporation to allocate its regular and special resources in such a way that Bolivia and
Ecuador are given a substantially larger share than they would receive if the distribution
were to be proportional to their contribution to the Corporation's capital.
Id. (emphasis added).
72. d at art. 119 ("In its periodic evaluations and annual reports, the General Secretariat shall
give separate and special consideration to Bolivia and Ecuador's situation in the subregional
integration effort and shall propose to the Commission the measures that it deems appropriate to
substantially improve their possibilities for development and increasingly expedite their participation in
the area's industrialization.") (emphasis added).
73. Id.at art. 120 ("The Commission may establish, for the benefit of any of the relatively less
developed countries, more favorable conditions and procedures than those considered in this Chapter, in
the light of the degree of development attained and the conditions for taking advantage of the benefits
of integration.") (emphasis added).
74. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 190 (3d ed. 2010).
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normally do not have a general exceptions clause equivalent to GATT's Articles
XX or XVIII. Notwithstanding, some treaties are now including these GATT-style
general exception clauses.75 The general approach given by scholars has been to
analyze non-precluded measures ("NPM") clauses commonly found in bilateral
investment treaties ("BITs"), such as those ratified by the United States, Germany,
the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union, Canada, and India.76 NPM clauses
contain specific exceptions for security, public order, taxation, and more recently,
environmental protection issues.
Canada is one of the countries that have started to include general exceptions
in some of its investment agreements. For example, Article 10 of its 2004 Model
BIT includes a general exception for: (i) the protection of human, animal, or plant
life or health; (ii) to ensure compliance with laws and regulations that are not
inconsistent with the Agreement; and (iii) the conservation of living or non-living
exhaustible natural resources.77 BIT Models from the United States,78 Colombia,79
8 8 82France,80 Germany, and Norway fail to incorporate any general exception
clauses, but do include NPM clauses.
A new trend among IIAs is the insertion of "Not Lowering Standard" clauses,
which recognize that parties to the treaty should not encourage investment by
relaxing domestic health, safety, or environmental measures or core labor
standards.83 The 2004 Canadian Model BIT contains the following clause:
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by
relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures.
Accordingly, a Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or
offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such measures as an
encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention
75. UNCTAD Secretariat, International Investment Rulemaking, N 34, U.N. Doc.
TD/B/COM.2/EM.21/2 (22 May 2007), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/c2em21 d2en.pdf; see also ANDREW
NEWCOMBE, General Exceptions in International Investment Agreements, in SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 351 (Marie-Clair Cordonnier Segger, et al. eds., 2011)
(indicating that by 2008 from more than 2800 IIAs, only a handful of 25 or 30 contained GATT like
general exceptions).
76. William W. Burke-White & Andreas Von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary
Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 307, 318 (2008).
77. Canada Model Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 10, 2004,
http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf [hereinafter Canada 2004 Model BIT].
78. 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 8(3), 2012,
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text020 for%20ACIEP/20Meeting.pdf.
79. Columbian Model Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art.
viii, 2007, http://italaw.com/documents/inv model bit colombia.pdf.
80. France Draft Bilateral Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments,
2006, http://italaw.com/documents/ModelTreatyFrance2006.pdf.
81. German Model Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, 2008, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1025.pdf.
82. Norway Draft Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 2007,
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita103 1.pdf [hereinafter Norway 2007 Model BIT].
83. Idat art. 11.
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in its territory of an investment of an investor. If a Party considers that
the other Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request
consultations with the other Party and the two Parties shall consult with
a view to avoiding any such encouragement.
8 4
However, these types of clauses do not have as their objective to encourage
development in the receiving state, the concern that belies them is the elimination
of the "rise to the bottom practice," which has allowed countries to compete for
investment by reducing or eliminating core health, environmental, or labor
regulations.
8 5
Although the inclusion of environmental principles has not been widely
accepted by investment tribunals, some cases have shown the importance of these
principles for the interpretation of treaty obligations. For example, in the
NAFTA/UNCITRAL case SD Myers v. Canada, the tribunal recognized that when
interpreting the treaty's content several principles that emerged from its context
should be taken into account, among them, that "environmental protection and
economic development can and should be mutually supportive."86  In the
subsequent case of Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, the
tribunal interpreted the "like circumstances" standard to include some
considerations on environmental protection, such as requirements set by the
UNESCO World Heritage Center.
8 7
The in dubio pro development principle and the RTD need to be applied at the
moment of interpreting the content of states' obligations toward foreign
investors, as part of IEL, i.e. international investment law. Principle and right
can be extracted from the text of the HAs. Most HAs include language in their
preamble that recognizes development as one of the investment regime's main
objectives. For example, the United States' HAs recognize that "treatment to be
accorded such investment will stimulate the flow of private capital and the
economic development of the Parties."
8 9
84. Canada 2004 Model BIT supra note 77, at art. 11.
85. JOs MANUEL ALVAREZ ZARATE, ALCA Y TLC CON ESTADOS UNIDOS: LA AGENDA DE
NEGOCIACI6N SUS COSTOS Y BENEFICIOS FRENTE A LOS INTERESES NACIONALES 257 (2004).
86. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Can., UNCITRAL Arb., Partial Award, 247 (Nov. 13, 2000),
http://www.intemational.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/myers-
18.pdf.
87. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, 381
(Sep. 11, 2007).
88. Omar E. Garcia-Bolivar, Defining an ICSID Investment: Why Economic Development Should
be the Core Element, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Apr. 13, 2012)
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/defining-an-icsid-investment-why-economic-development-should.
be-the-core-element!.
89. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru.,
Nov. 4, 2005, T.I.A.S. No. 06-1101, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/56650.pdf; see also
Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Azer., Aug. 1,
1997, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-47 (2000),
http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/43478.pdf; Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Bangl., Mar. 12, 1986, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-23
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Furthermore, more recent IIAs include clauses that require the investment to
be made in compliance with the laws and regulations of the state. Although the
wording of these clauses can differ in each treaty, their purpose is to prevent the
protection of investments that have been made in violation of the host country's
laws or policies toward the development of a specific economic sector.
90 These
clauses may be found in several ILAs, for example, in the treaties ratified between
Spain and several Latin American countries.91
IV. TREATY OBLIGATIONS AND THE JNDUBIO PRO DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLE
Development is commonly expressed as a goal and an important value in
several instruments, as mentioned earlier. The question of finding a normative
value for development in treaties, where this goal is not mentioned throughout a
treaty text, would initially hinder development-related considerations when
applying the treaty. Yet, development oriented interpretations could diverge among
different trade panels and investment tribunals, but mostly among trade and
investment systems. As Markus Wagner indicates,
Divergence in interpreting different treaty language is certainly not a
new phenomenon... However, the potential of the two dispute settlement
systems deciding that countries have divergent regulatory space-
especially when it concerns a challenge to the same governmental
measure--has the potential to severely undermine the predictability for
governments to regulate... 92 upon development policies.
There is not a single answer as to what extent the RTD and the in dubio pro
development principle may reach because much would depend on treaty language.
A. The Trade Regime and the RTD
The World Trade Organization ("WTO") regime's preamble has a clear
development goal and several rules on agreements that confirm such goals, such as
Special and Differentiated Treatment ("SDT").93 The SDT is a set of GATT
provisions designed to give special treatment to developing countries when
(1986), http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/USBangladesh-e.asp; Treaty
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, US-Hond., July 1, 1995, S.
TREATY DOc. No. 106-27, (2000),
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/USHondurase.asp.
90. Salini Costruttori S.P.A. & Italstrade S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 46 (Jul. 23, 2001), 42 ILM 609 (2003) [hereinafter "Salini v.
Morocco"].
91. Acuerdo entre el Reino de Espafia y la Repfiblica de Colombia para la Promoci6n y
Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, Colom.-Spain, Mar. 31, 2005,
http://www.sice.oas.org/lnvestment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/COLSpain-S.pdf; Acuerdo para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, Ecuador-Spain, Jun. 26, 1996,
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BlTs/ECUSpain-S.pdf; Acuerdo para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones, Mex-Spain, Oct. 10, 2006,
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investnent/BITSbyCountry/BITs/MEXSpain-S.asp.
92. Wagner, supra note 9, at 9-10
93. See ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 5, at 192-193.
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participating in the international trade of their domestic products.94 The underlying
idea was that these economies would eventually develop through the promotion
and strengthening of trade. Unfortunately this idea failed to come to fruition, as
was expected by an array of emerging nations.
The RTD has been clearly recognized in IEL treaty practice and case law in
Latin America, as seen in the Andean Community's economic integration
agreement. The Andean Community Court of Justice (Tribunal de Justicia de la
Comunidad Andina, in Spanish, or "TJCA") 95 specified that the RTD was
established in Articles 1 and 2 of the Cartagena Agreement, the founding treaty of
the Andean Community, which establishes as the main objective of the
Community the promotion of a balanced, harmonious, and equitable development
of the Member Countries, and the improvement of the standard of living of the
sub-region's population.96  Through its case law, the Court has developed and
applied the RTD, which has spilled over into the interpretation and application of
all rules in the sub-regional legal system.97 Therefore, any rule contained in the
legal system of the Andean Community should be interpreted in a way that
guarantees the enduring improvement in the standard of living of the population.
For example, the right to development in the TJCA should be broadly interpreted,
as a country's development should be aimed at meeting the fundamental needs of
its people through economic and social integration, the acceleration of growth, the
generation of employment, the participation in the process of regional integration,
and the equitable distribution of the benefits of this process among Member
States.98 Through the application of this principle, the Court interpreted and
limited the rights and obligations of the states in order to protect fundamental
collective rights recognized under the sub-regional legal system, such as the right
to education, health, a healthy environment and the right of indigenous people to
prior consultation;99 as the TJCA has recognized the link with human rights
94. Id.at 110.
95. The Court of Justice for the Andean Community [hereinafter T.J.C.A.] is the dispute
settlement mechanism of the Andean Community, created in 1979 by the Treaty Creating the Court of
Justice of the Cartagena Agreement (amended by the Cochabamba Protocol). The object of the Court is
to interpret, enforce and settle disputes between its four Members States: Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and
Ecuador. See generally, Cartagena Agreement, supra note 68.
96. Id.at art 1, see e.g., T.J.C.A., Proceso 137-IP-2003 (Mar. 10, 2004),
intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/Procesos/1 37-IP-2003.doc [hereinafter Proceso 137-IP-
2003].
97. See, Proceso 137-IP-2003, supra note 96.
98. Jd.at 7 (The original text reads: "En este marco, se concibe el desarrollo de los Paises
Miembros como un proceso dirigido a procurar la satisfacci6n de las necesidades fundamentales de sus
habitantes, mediante la integraci6n y la cooperaci6n econ6mica y social, la aceleraci6n del crecimiento,
la generaci6n de ocupaci6n y la participaci6n en el proceso de integraci6n regional. Adems, de
conformidad con el articulo 2 del Acuerdo, el desarrollo debe conducir a una distribuci6n equitativa de
los beneficios de la integraci6n entre los Paises Miembros, de modo de reducir sus diferencias.").
99. T.J.C.A, Proceso 60-IP-2012 (Oct. 24, 2012),
http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/Procesos/60-IP-2012.doc (protecting the right of
indigenous people in Colombia to prior consultation in cases where someone is using the community's
traditional knowledge. In doing so, the Tribunal stated:
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treaties.
100
B. The Investment Regime and the RTD
1. ICSID Convention
The relationship between development and the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") convention has been a subject of
thorough academic discussion, mostly through a "jurisdictional gate keeping,"'
01
but it would exceed the scope of this paper to address such an issue. Rather than
focusing on whether investment contributes to development, this work draws
attention to the policy space an investment host country has in order to pursue
developmental measures.
Notwithstanding that the discussion here is different, the Salini10 2 criteria does
have valuable legal merit. Some lines may be devoted to the existence of an
investment in order to apply the standards of the IIA to such and its contribution to
development. The Salini criteria consider the importance of development and
conclude that the investment should contribute to the economic development of the
host state.' 3  After Salini, the question has fallen to unsettled discussions
considering that tribunals are reticent to recognize the development criteria as they
usually assume that investment per se contributes to the development of host
states.
The Community's rules on industrial property must be in accordance and harmony with the
protection of human rights, as these are the cornerstone for the performance of all sub-legal
operators. It is not possible understand that then Community's IP standard recedes from said
protection, especially if the fundamental basis of the process of integration is the inhabitant
of the sub-region (paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the Cartagena Agreement). Based on this
considerations Article 3 of Decision 486 of the Andes Community Commission was issued,
aiming to strike a balance between the industrial property rights and the rights of indigenous
peoples and communities.
(translation by the author)); T.J.C.A., Proceso 107-IP-2008 (Feb. 4, 2009),
intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/Procesos/1 07-IP-2008.doc (establishing that the
Community's regulation on trade secrets hould always be interpreted in the light of the limits imposed
by collective rights of a fundamental character) (translation by the author); T.J.C.A., Proceso I 10-IP-
2007 (Dec. 4, 2007), intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/Procesos/1 10-IP-2007.doc
(establishing that copyright is not absolute because they should be interpreted in the light of their social
function, which includes considerations on the right to information, access to knowledge, and
education) (translation by the author); T.J.C.A., Proceso, 114-IP-2009 (Apr. 29, 2010),
intranet.comunidadandina.orgfDocumentos/Procesos/114-IP-2009.doc [hereinafter Proceso 114-IP-
2009] (establishing that any rule under Decision 436 (regarding phytosanitary measures) should take
into account the protection of the life, health and a safety environment) (translation by the author).
100. See, Proceso 114-IP-2009, supra note 99, 23-24; T.J.C.A., Proceso 43-IP-2014 53 (Jun.
10, 2014), intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/Procesos/43-IP-2014.doc.
101. See generally, Desierto, supra note 17, at 296.
102. A body of ICSID case law, which has developed around the meaning of "investment," has
come to be known as the "Salini test." "Salini v. Morocco,",supra note 90, 52. The four elements of
the Salini test are: (i) a contribution in money or other assets; (ii) a certain duration; (iii) an element of
risk; and (iv) a contribution to the host State's economy.
103. Id.
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This position, which could be true in most cases, should not be considered as
an absolute truth or a rule, because it appears subjective when tribunals do not
review empirical data or economic evidence to support such a claim.0 4 Indeed it is
a rebuttable premise, especially when a respondent state provides evidence
demonstrating that investment does not contribute to development but in return has
a higher social cost to the host country.'0 5 As far as arbitral practice is concerned,
arbitrators tend to assume that the development-requirement criterion within the
Salini test is usually subsumed by the criteria of assumption of risk, investment
duration, and capital commitment; 106 nevertheless, arbitrators have not affirmed
this is always the case, leaving the door open for further discussion. Arbitrators
have reacted, without much analysis or empirical evidence, to respondent states
that claim that the investor did not contribute to the state's development.'
0 7
Supporting decisions based on assumptions of development, without first assessing
economic facts or empirical work in a case, justifies the investment system's
critiques of arbitrators' subjectivity. 18 Julie Maupin provides important reasons
for looking at empirical scholarship, which can enhance the pool of information
available to influence "neutrals," (i.e., arbitrators), and can help debunk myths and
challenge assumptions, as arbitrators may take "into account empirical evidence on
the operation of the IIL system when steering tribunals and drafting awards."'
109
A regrettable example of the above is the tribunal's decision on jurisdiction in
Philip Morris v. Uruguay,"l0 which ignored the respondent's argument regarding
the claimant's contribution to Uruguay's economy in comparison with the social
and economic cost it represents. It was an argument cleverly constructed by
Uruguay in order to discuss whether these sorts of investments are indeed
contributing to a host state's development.1" Unfortunately, as Julie Maupin
points out about what empirical studies cannot do, "if.. . detailed case studies do
104. Susan D. Franck, Empiricism and International Law: Insights for Investment Treaty Dispute
Resolution, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 768, 795 (2008) [hereinafter Franck, Empiricism and International Law];
Dr. Julie Maupin, Empirics and Opposition: What Empirical Studies Can (and Can't) Do for
International Investment Law Scholarship (Apr. 27-28, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (Dr. Julie Maupin was a presenter the London School of Economics Workshop on the Political
Economy of Investment Treaties).
105. See Philip Morris Brands Sdri, Philip Morris Products S.A. & Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Uru.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 (July 2, 2013) [hereinafter "Philip Morris v. Uruguay"] (where Philip
Morris brought a claim against Uruguay for implementing tobacco regulations for the purpose of
improving public health).
106. Salini v. Morocco, supra note 92, 52.
107. Whenever Tribunals decide on development issues they should rely more on economic data
and empirical evidence when assessing such matters. Regarding what empirical scholarship
methodologies can do for investment arbitration see Franck, Empiricism and International Law, supra
note 104, at 795 ("Investment treaty dispute resolution could obtain useful information by using
different research methodologies (whether they be quantitative, qualitative, or mixed methods) to
evaluate key questions"); see also, Maupin supra note 104.
108. See Franck, Development and Outcomes, supra note 7, at 453.
109. Maupin, supra note 104, at 5-6.
110. "Philip Morris v. Uruguay," supra note 105.
111. Id 176-82.
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not convince a non-believer that international investment disputes sometimes do
impact the public interest, then it is unlikely that an empirical demonstration of the
same phenomenon will do so."
11
2
This paper does not attempt to analyze in depth the negotiation history of the
ICSID Convention; but this example does show that the Centre was created as the
result of a compromise between investment-exporting and investment-receiving
nations, the latter comprising the bulk of nations which would eventually demand
recognition of their RTD and the application of the in dubio pro development
principle. It has been understood that behind the creation of the ICSID there was a
"grand-bargain,"113 which can be simplified as the acceptance of international
arbitration by developing nations, considering the influx of investment that would
eventually develop their economies.'14
In this way, acknowledging that not all economic activities contribute to the
development of host states, and as such they could be refused access to the Centre,
would create a standard that would be in accordance with the original compromise
upon which the ICSID was created. On the one hand, states would still have a
chance to show that certain economic activities are not worth being protected
through ICSID arbitration, due to the fact that the social and economic burden of
hosting such investment nullifies its development-related rewards."s On the other
hand, investors would not have to prove such a contribution to development every
time they attempt to access ICSID arbitration, which seems to be the situation that
has given rise to the controversy in this regard.
116
Finally, as for the merits, the RTD and its corollary in dubio pro development
principle, play an important role in knowing the limits of states to enact
developmental policies armored against investor challenges. The definition of
development would become crucial, but, as Diane Desierto discovered, none of the
31 tribunals reviewed indicated a workable definition of the RTD117 and neither of
the economic definitions have helped to reach a unified meaning."i8
Nevertheless, the ICSID Convention preamble clearly recognizes "the need
for international cooperation for economic development, and the role of private
international investment therein"'
' 19
Therefore, it is inconceivable to uphold the belief that if a developing country
needs to improve reasonable development conditions, it should be restrained. On
the contrary, as established in the preamble, it can be interpreted that the ICSID
Convention states that cooperative means among countries and investors shall
112. Maupin, supra note 104, at 7.
113. Desierto, supra note 17, at 298.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., "Philip Morris v. Uruguay," supra note 105, 176-82 (arguing that the "investment"
of Philip Morris hinders development).
116. Desierto, supra note 17, at 299.
117. Id.at301,332.
118. ROLLAND, Development, supra note 5, at 24-28.
119. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States, Preamble, Mar. 18 1965,17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
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foster economic development. This is because it is inherent to international
cooperation that all actors - states and investors -make efforts to achieve the
development purpose, as there is a natural balance between investment protection
and economic development. On a case-by-case basis, the policy space to achieve
development may be reduced if measures are unexpected, arbitrary, or odiously
discriminatory. Arbitrators were given wide discretion to decide on such issues.
120
The myth that IIAs are inclined to protect investors and not safeguard the
wellbeing and interest of a state's inhabitants must be better evaluated. Arbitrators
need to keep in mind that the IIAs were not intended to be hostile to states and that
the adjudicative system was based on values and principles of legality, fairness,
and neutrality. Therefore, arbitrators must be cautious regarding an expansive
interpretation that is unsympathetic to an investor's host countries. As Gus Van
Harten remarks, "the interpretation and application of the law should reflect a
degree of evenness between claimants and respondent States in the resolution of
contentious legal issues arising from ambiguous treaty texts and should be free
from significant variation based on claimant nationality."
121
As many cases are brought to the ICSID through IlAs, the RTD will likely be
made clearer as the new generations of IIAs are provided with more RTD-related
language.
2. The IIAs
Development of the Parties is a common term that can be observed in several
IIAs, especially in FTAs and trade co-operation agreements where such
undertakings are included in the agreement.122 Nevertheless, the extent to which it
is normative is still disputed, perhaps due to the disdain of tribunals.'23 It should
be noted that when the development language is enshrined in an IIA, the RTD has
legal space to be operationalized because the negotiators had the intention of
giving effect to such language.
124
120. See Lise Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, Investor-State Contracts, Host State "Commitments"
and the Myth of Stability in International Law, 24 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 361, 411 (2013).
121. Gus Van Harten, Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 211, 214-216 (2012) ("Two significant
tendencies were observed. The first was a strong tendency toward expansive resolutions that enhanced
the compensatory promise of the system for claimants and, in turn, the risk of liability for respondent
states. The second was an accentuated tendency toward expansive resolutions where the claimant was
from a Western capital exporting state.").
122. Desierto, supra note 17, at 323-324 (pointing out that regional trade cooperation agreements
by developing countries respond to development concerns in the context of investment protection, like
in the Investment Agreement on the COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa)
Common Investment Area, the 2009 ASEAN (Association of southeast Asian Nations) Comprehensive
Investment Agreement, and the 2009 ASEAN-China Investment Agreement).
123. See "Philip Morris v. Uruguay," supra note 105.
124. The process of negotiating any treaty is long and difficult for the public officials involved.
Every word and obligation of the treaty is carefully studied, as it is well known that an effect will be
given afterwards. Therefore, if the term "development" is included in a legal instrument such as an HA,
a legal effect must be given to it, as the principle of useful effect must be applied when the countries
enact pro developmental policies. The useful effect principle has been recognized in ILEL. MARION
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The main question is whether the adoption of public policies to foster
development may be considered a breach of IIA-derived obligations.
Most cases in investment law dealing with these questions have taken the
perspective of justifying the state's conduct. Usually states have defended
themselves from IIA claims under limited exception clauses in their respective
HAs. 125  This perspective creates a problematic situation when dealing with
justification or exceptions where one has already determined that a breach of an
obligation has occurred.
If IIA obligations such as Fair and Equitable Treatment ("FET") are
interpreted with a development-related focus, no violation of such an obligation
may occur when the measure in question is development-related. The adoption of
a measure that would, for example, foster the economic advancement of
marginalized populations or general measures that protect the environment or
public health, would have to be considered within the state's regulatory autonomy
of what is fair and equitable.
While investment law was originally a protection against abusive behaviors
by host states, it has turned out to be an external instance of the judicial review of
governmental policies, which may have been found to be legal even by their
internal review procedures. 
126
Thus, the standard of review of what is fair and equitable must be flexible
depending on the nature of the developmental measure in question and the
interpretation of this treaty-derived obligation must not only be understood in the
literal sense of the terms fair and equitable. In the case of development-related
measures, FET must be interpreted under the Neer standard: "the treatment of an
alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an
outrage, to bad faith, to willful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of
governmental action so far short of international standards that every reasonable
and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency."127 This approach is
consistent with the application of the in dubio pro development principle; the
adoption of these measures must be presumed as conforming to the IIA, as part of
a state's legitimate regulatory powers.128 Thus, a claimant must prove that here
was a gross violation to due process, legitimate expectations, impartiality, and non-
discrimination in order to show the existence of a breach of such an obligation.
129
The fact that the adoption of pro-development measures is understood not to
PANIZZON, GOOD FAITH IN THE WTO JURISPRUDENCE: THE PROTECTION OF LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATIONS, GOOD FAITH INTERPRETATION AND FAIR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 123 (2006).
125. NEWCOMBE, supra note 75, at 6.
126. See Johnson & Volkov, supra note 120, at 380.
127. Neer v. United Mexican States, IV R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 60, 61-62 (Gen. Claims Comm'n
(U.S.-Mex.) 1926) http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/volIV/60-66.pdf.
128. The legitimate regulatory powers that a state still holds and that are not limited by the HAs, as
provided by the Neer standard. Id.
129. The Neer standard should apply to developmental policies, otherwise the in dubio pro
development principle would be violated.
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breach an obligation is fundamental.130  When addressing justifications of IIA-
breaches, tribunals tend to differ regarding issues such as the self-judging nature of
an exception, or whether the justification regime within the IIA is self-contained,
or is to be interpreted under the necessity standard.
13
These discussions have resulted in technicalities that lead to tribunals failing
to find states "justified" and thus responsible for the breach of an international
economic obligation.132  This situation is incongruent, both with the harmonic
interpretation of IIAs and the in dubio pro development principle. It is
inconceivable that states have been granted an RTD, but are deprived of the means
to achieve such a goal.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the RTD and the in dubio pro development principle are legally
binding within the IEL system as they are founding doctrines of a legal system that
inspired development-like language in international trade and investment treaties at
the World Trade Organization; FTAs and IIAs signed among developed states and
emerging national economies. Some critiques may arise, but they will be similar
to the criticisms given to various awards and scholarly literature on this matter that
had advanced on the development of principles and rules derived from the treaties.
Arbitrators or panelists may decide whether or not to apply the RTD and the
in dubio pro development principle in an IEL case, but they cannot completely
deny their existence in trade and investment treaties, as such panelists and
arbitrators have had created other principles and rules the same way as suggested
in this paper.
130. If the RTD and the in dubio pro development principle are not recognized as legal binding
obligations contained in the IlAs, countries in their process to develop may not take developmental
policies, as they would be fatally sued before an international body of arbitrators.
131. Julie Bdard, et. al, New ICSID Annulment Decision Exposes Possible Gap in United States
Investment Treaty Protection, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (July 19, 2010),
http://www.skadden.com/insights/new-icsid-annulment-decision-exposes-possible-gap-united-states-
investment-treaty-protection.
132. Id.
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